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Adecisionmaker,namedAlice,wantstoknowifanexperthassigniﬁcantinforma-
tion about payoff-relevant probabilities of future events. The expert, named Bob,
either knows this probability almost perfectly or knows nothing about it. Hence,
both Alice and the uninformed expert face uncertainty: they do not know the
payoff-relevant probability. Alice offers a contract to Bob. If he accepts this con-
tract then he must announce the probability distribution before any data are ob-
served. Once the data unfold, transfers between Alice and Bob occur. It is demon-
strated that if the informed expert accepts some contract then the uninformed
expert also accepts this contract. Hence, Alice’s adverse selection problem can-
not be mitigated by screening contracts that separate informed from uninformed
experts. This result stands in contrast with the analysis of contracts under risk,
where separation is often feasible.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Contracts may be able to screen agents facing different levels of risk. In a typical model,
an agent knows privately the risks he faces and a principal offers a menu of contracts to
the agent anticipating that some contracts will be accepted only by agents facing spe-
ciﬁc risks. This basic idea has been investigated in different markets, but relatively little
attention has been dedicated to the possibly widespread case in which the parties in-
volved in the contract face uncertainty: the information available to them is so vague
that it cannot be properly summarized by probabilities.
Consider a principal, named Alice, who must make a decision without knowing the
payoff-relevant probabilities. A potential expert, named Bob, claims that he knows the
probabilities of interest. Bob may be an informed expert who knows these probabilities
almost perfectly. Bob may alternatively be a false expert who does not know anything
about the payoff-relevant probabilities.
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Alice offers a contract to Bob. If Bob accepts the contract he must deliver to Alice all
probabilities at period zero (i.e., before any data are revealed). Then, as the data unfold,
transfers occur between Alice and Bob. These transfers depend upon the probabilities
Bob announced at period zero and the data observed in the subsequent periods.
The question addressed in this paper is whether there exists a screening contract
that separates informed and uninformed experts. If informed, the expert must accept
the contract and reveal the probabilities truthfully. If uninformed, the expert must not
accept the contract. If such a contract exists, then Alice knows that she can rely on the
probabilities announced to her, and make her decision under rational expectations.
We make several assumptions that simplify the task of ﬁnding such a screening con-
tract. The expert, if informed, is assumed to announce the probabilities truthfully. We
assume also that Alice is willing to pay large amounts to learn the relevant probabili-
ties. Finally, we assume the uninformed expert to be extremely averse to uncertainty.
He accepts the contract only when it is beneﬁcial to him in the worse-case scenario.
That is, he accepts the contract when his expected utility with the contract (calculated
under any probability measure over the future realization of the data) exceeds his utility
without the contract.
We show that even under these rather extreme assumptions, a screening contract
that separates informed and uninformed experts does not exist. If the informed expert
accepts a contract then the uninformed expert also accepts the contract. Hence, Alice
faces an adverse selection problem that cannot be eased by screening contracts and
the discipline that data could potentially deliver. Alice may not be able to ﬁnd out the
quality of the announced probabilities. This result stands in contrast with the analysis
of contracts under risk where separation is often feasible.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief review of related
literatures. In Section 2, the model and result is shown when Alice has one data point.
Section 3 extends the result to the case in which multiple data points are available. Sec-
tion 4 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
Related literatures
As is well known, Ellsberg (1961) demonstrated that the distinction between risk (where
the perceived chances can be represented by probabilities) and uncertainty (where
the perceived chances cannot be represented by probabilities) has empirical mean-
ing. However, this distinction cannot be properly made under Savage’s (1954) axiomatic
foundation. Recently, considerable effort has been dedicated to provide an alternative
axiomatic foundation where this distinction can be made.
The literature on uncertainty is quite large. An important idea in this literature is
maxmin expected utility representation, according to which the value of an alternative
is determined as if the decision maker calculated his minimal expected utility within a
class of possible probability measures (see Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989). Bob, if uni-
formed, faces uncertainty, and his decision (to accept or reject Alice’s contract) is con-
sistent with this representation. However, our main objective, unlike that of most of the
literature on uncertainty, is not to deliver a representation theorem, but rather to show
strategies that effectively reduce uncertainty.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Contracts and uncertainty 3
A recent branch of the literature on games against nature (which can be traced back
to Milnor 1954 and Wald 1950) shows that it is possible, without knowing the data gen-
erating process, to strategically produce empirical models that will not be rejected by
future realizations of the data (see, among others, Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi 2006, Dekel
and Feinberg 2006, Foster and Vohra 1998, Fudenberg and Levine 1999, Hart 2005, Hart
and Mas-Colell 2001, Lehrer 2001, Lehrer and Solan 2003, Olszewski and Sandroni 2006,
Rustichini 1999, Sandroni 2003, Sandroni et al. 2003, and Vovk and Shafer 2005). This
paper shares with this literature a basic tool: the minmax theorem. Moreover, an empir-
ical test can be seen as a special contract that delivers high payoffs (to the expert) if his
empirical model is not rejected and low payoffs otherwise.
2. MODEL AND RESULT
A decision maker, named Alice, does not know the probability of an outcome that can
either be 0 or 1. Alice has two available choices, also labelled 0 or 1. Alice prefers choice
j ∈ {0,1} when the outcome is j. She is averse to uncertainty and is willing to pay for a
credible announcement of the probability of outcome 1.
A potential expert, named Bob, claims to know almost perfectly the probability of
outcome 1. Bob may be either an informed or an uninformed expert. If informed, Bob
has a signal p ∈ [0,1] that says that the probability of outcome 1 is in a neighborhood
B"(p) of p, where
B"(p)≡[p −",p +"]∩[0,1] for some " >0.
If uninformed, Bob knows nothing about the probability of outcome 1.
Alice offers a contract to Bob. If Bob accepts the contract then he must deliver to
Alice a probability p ∈[0,1] of outcome 1. The contract speciﬁes wealth transfers c(0,p)
and c(1,p) that can be either positive or negative. So, if Bob announces p ∈ [0,1] and
i ∈ {0,1} occurs then Alice transfers c(i,p) ∈ R to Bob and Bob’s wealth is w +c(i,p).
Without a contract, Bob’s wealth is w >0.
Alice can ﬁnd out a close estimate of the probability of outcome 1 if she can write a
contract such that Bob, if informed, accepts it and truthfully reveals his signal. In addi-
tion,Bob,ifuninformed,mustnotacceptthecontract. WeassumethatBob,ifinformed,
always reveals his signal p truthfully. This assumption makes Alice’s task signiﬁcantly
easier. The remaining question is the existence of a screening contract that separates
the informed and the uninformed expert (i.e., the contract is accepted by an informed
expert, but is not accepted by an uninformed expert).
ASSUMPTION 1. Thereexistsη>0suchthatforeveryp ∈[0,1]andi ∈{0,1}, ifc(i,p)<0
then c(i,p)<−η.
Thisassumptionsays thatthereexistsaminimumcost η toBobifhe mustpayAlice.
This cost can be understood as the value of the minimum time required to make any
payment.1
1It is natural to assume also that w +c(i,p)≥0 for all p ∈[0,1] and i ={0,1} to insure that Bob is always
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ASSUMPTION 2. For every p ∈ [0,1] there is an outcome i ∈ {0,1} such that c(i,p) < 0
and c(j,p)≥0 for j 6=i.
By this assumption, for one outcome Bob makes a strictly positive payment to Alice
and for the other outcome Alice makes a (positive or zero) payment to Bob. This as-
sumption is made for simplicity and is not necessary for Proposition 1 and Corollary 1.
If it does not hold then there exists ¯ p ∈ [0,1] such that either c(i, ¯ p) ≥ 0 for both out-
comes or c(i, ¯ p)<0 for both outcomes. In the former case, an uninformed expert could
accept the contract and report ¯ p (because then Bob never makes a strictly positive pay-
ment to Alice). In the latter case, an informed expert who receives a signal ¯ p does not
accept the contract and reveal ¯ p (because then Bob makes a strictly positive payment to
Alice for both outcomes).
DEFINITION 1. An informed expert accepts a contract c if there exists ˜ " > 0 such that for
every p ∈[0,1],
min
p0 ∈ B ˜ "(p)
p0u(w +c(1,p))+(1−p0)u(w +c(0,p))≥u(w),
where u :R→R is a strictly increasing utility function.
This deﬁnition should be interpreted as follows. The informed expert knows that
the probability of outcome 1 is in B"(p). He faces some residual uncertainty because he
doesnotknowtheexactprobabilityofoutcome1. AccordingtoGilboaandSchmeidler’s
1989 model of decision-making under uncertainty, an individual evaluates an uncer-
tain prospect by the minimum of the expected utilities over a (subjectively determined)
range of probabilities. However, this range of probabilities (for the informed expert who
accepts the contract) should be a subset of B"(p). Indeed, recent research in decision
theory (see, for example, Gajdos et al. 2006) suggests models in which the subjective
range of probabilities is a subset of the set of all objectively possible probabilities.
Assumethereforethattheinformedexpertevaluatesthecontractc bytheminimum
of expected utilities over a set B ⊂ B"(p). Alice does not know Bob’s set B as it is sub-
jectively determined. Deﬁnition 1 requires that the informed expert accept the con-
tract c when he is sufﬁciently precisely informed for any subjective set of probabilities
B ⊂ B"(p).
DEFINITION 2. An informed expert strongly accepts a contract c if for every p ∈[0,1] and
some δ >0,
pu(w +c(1,p))+(1−p)u(w +c(0,p))≥u(w)+δ.
Bob, if informed, strongly accepts contract c if his expected utility with c is bounded
above his utility without a contract. The probability used in the computation of the
expected utility is Bob’s signal p.
As long as the utilities {u(w +c(i,p)) : p ∈ [0,1], i ∈ {0,1}} remain bounded, if an
expert strongly accepts a contract then he accepts the contract. The following result is a
converse.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Contracts and uncertainty 5
LEMMA 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if an informed expert accepts a contract c then he
strongly accepts contract c.
Here is an example of a contract that is strongly accepted by an informed expert.
EXAMPLE 1. Assume that w =10 and u(x)=x. Let ¯ c be such that
¯ c(1,p)=
(
(1−p)2 −1.5+δ if p <0.5
(1−p)2 +1+δ if p ≥0.5
¯ c(0,p)=
(
p2 +1+δ if p <0.5
p2 −1.5+δ if p ≥0.5
where δ >0 is small—let’s say 0.1.
Contract ¯ c satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 2. In addition, for " small enough, Bob, if
informed, accepts contract ¯ c.2
Now consider Bob’s decision when he is uninformed. Consider ﬁrst the option of
accepting contract ¯ c and announcing a probability q ∈ [0,1]. Bob prefers this option to




where C is some closed interval of [0,1].
IfC is large enough (e.g., the interior ofC contains 0.4/1.5 and 1.1/1.5) then (1) does
not hold for any q ∈ [0,1].3 Thus Bob, if uninformed and sufﬁciently averse to uncer-
tainty, prefers to not accept the contract rather than to accept it and deterministically
announce any probability of outcome 1. ◊
The key element missing in the analysis of Example 1 is that Bob need not deliver
a probability of outcome 1 deterministically. By selecting the probability of outcome
1 at random, Bob produces a new source of risk, but not a new source of uncertainty





i=1γi =1, Bob picks pi with probability γi.
2This follows because if p <0.5 then ¯ c(1,p)≤−0.4 and ¯ c(0,p)≥1.1, and if p ≥0.5 then ¯ c(1,p)≥1.1 and
¯ c(0,p)≤−0.4. Moreover, for all p ∈[0,1],
pc(1,p)+(1−p)c(0,p)≥δ >0
and so for a small ˜ ",
p
0c(1,p)+(1−p
0)c(0,p)≥δ for all p
0 ∈ B ˜ "(p).
3This follows because if p0 is slightly smaller than 0.4/1.5 then p0c(1,q)+(1−p0)c(0,q) is an increasing











be the expected utility of the uninformed expert if the outcome is i ∈{0,1}.
DEFINITION 3. An uninformed expert accepts a contract c if there exists ¯ ζ ∈ Λ[0,1] such
that
¯ ζ(0)≥u(w) and ¯ ζ(1)≥u(w). (2)
If (2) holds, then no matter which outcome is realized, the expected utility of the




p0 ¯ ζ(1)+(1−p0)¯ ζ(0)≥u(w).
So, Bob accepts the contract no matter how averse to uncertainty he might be. We
now show the main result of this paper.4
PROPOSITION 1. If an informed expert strongly accepts a contract c then an uninformed
expert also accepts contract c.
Bob, if uniformed, faces uncertainty because he does not know the probabilities of
0 and 1. However, he can virtually eliminate his uncertainty as far as the decision re-
garding the contract is concerned by selecting his announcements strategically. This
follows because no matter whether 0 or 1 occurs, Bob’s expected utility, calculated un-
der the known odds of his own randomization, is greater with the contract than without
it, provided that the same is true for the informed expert.
An intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. Consider a zero-sum game between Bob
andNature. Naturechoosesaprobabilityp0 ∈[0,1]. Bobchoosesζ∈Λ[0,1]. Bob’spayoff
is
p0ζ(1)+(1−p0)ζ(0).
For every strategy p0 of Nature, there is a strategy for Bob (to select p0 with probabil-
ity one) that delivers payoff
p0u(w +c(1,p0))+(1−p0)u(w +c(0,p0)).
By assumption, this payoff is greater than u(w). Hence, by Fan’s 1953 minmax the-
orem, there is a strategy ¯ ζ that gives Bob a payoff greater than u(w), no matter which
strategy Nature chooses. Corollary 1 follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1.5
4In fact, a stronger result can be obtained, in which (2) is replaced with ¯ ζ(0) ≥ u(w) + δ0 and ¯ ζ(1) ≥
u(w)+δ0 for some δ0 >0.
5Notice that Assumption 2 is redundant here; see the discussion that follows Assumption 2.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Contracts and uncertainty 7
COROLLARY 1. Under Assumption 1, if an informed expert accepts a contract c, then an
uninformed expert also accepts contract c.
Thatis,Alicecannotwriteacontractthatscreensinformedanduninformedexperts.
It is not feasible for Alice to determine whether Bob is an honest and informed expert,
or a strategic and uninformed expert. The nonexistence of screening contracts shows
thatAlice’sadverseselectionproblemcannotbemitigatedbycontractualarrangements.
Assume that Bob is informed, but Alice is not willing to accept Bob’s advice without the
securitythatachoiceofcontractscouldprovide(ifascreeningcontractdidexist). Then,
Alice cannot learn from Bob the relevant probabilities.
In Proposition 1, Alice has only one data point at her disposal. However, the basic
idea still holds if Alice has several data points. In the next section, a result analogous to
Proposition 1 is presented in a model with multiple data points.
3. A MULTI-PERIOD MODEL
Each period one outcome, 0 or 1, is observed.6 Let N be the set of natural numbers. Let
{0,1}t, t ∈ N, be the t-fold Cartesian product of {0,1}. Let Ω = {0,1}∞ be the set of all
paths, i.e., inﬁnite sequences of outcomes. Let Ω=∪t∈N{0,1}t ∪{s0} be union of the null
history s0 with the set of all ﬁnite histories.
For every ﬁnite history st ∈{0,1}t, t ∈N, a cylinder with base on st is the set C(st)=
{s ∈ Ω | s = (st,...)} of all paths whose t initial elements coincide with st. Let ℑt be
the σ-algebra that consists of all ﬁnite unions of cylinders with base on {0,1}t. Let ℑ be
the σ-algebra generated by the algebra ℑ0 ≡∪t∈Nℑt, i.e., ℑ is the smallest σ-algebra that
contains ℑ0.
Let (Ω,ℑ,P) be a measure space, where P is a probability measure. Let ∆(Ω) be the
set of probability measures on (Ω,ℑ). Let Λ∆(Ω) be the set of probability measures on
∆(Ω) with ﬁnite support.
Atperiodzero,aprincipal,namedAlice,offersacontracttoapotentialexpertnamed
Bob. If Bob accepts the contract then he must deliver a probability measure P ∈∆(Ω) to
Alice at period zero. The contract speciﬁes monetary transfers depending upon Bob’s
report and the data observed by Alice.
DEFINITION 4. A contract is a function C :Ω×∆(Ω)→R.
A contract C speciﬁes a transfer of C(s0,P) at period zero and a transfer of C(st,P)
at period t if st is observed. Transfers can be positive or negative. If Bob rejects Alice’s
contract then Bob’s endowment is exogenously given by a function w : Ω → R that is
assumed to be bounded (i.e., there exists M > 0 such that |w(st)| ≤ M for all st ∈ Ω). So
without a contract, Bob’s wealth at period t is w(st). If Bob accepts a contract C and
announces P, then his endowment, at period t, is w(st)+C(st,P).
6The results may immediately be extended to the case in which there are ﬁnitely many possible out-
comes in each period.8 Olszewski and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
ASSUMPTION 3. A contract C is bounded. That is, for every P ∈ ∆(Ω) there exists M(P)
such that
|C(st,P)|≤M(P) for every st ∈Ω.
A contract is bounded if it does not specify arbitrarily large transfers. Hence,
bounded contracts ensure limited liability.








be the difference in Bob’s discounted sum of utilities with and without a contract, where
β ∈[0,1) is a discount factor and u :R→R is a continuous utility function.
Let Us : ∆(Ω) → R and UP : Ω → R be functions such that Us(P) = UP(s) = U(s,P).7
Let EP be the expectation operator associated with P ∈ ∆(Ω). Let Eζ be the expectation
operator associated with a random generator of probability measures ζ∈Λ∆(Ω).8
DEFINITION 5. A contractC is strongly accepted by an informed expert if for some δ >0,
EP{UP}¾δ for every P ∈∆(Ω). (3)
Assume that Bob knows the data generating process. If (3) is satisﬁed, then Bob’s ex-
pected discounted utility is higher (and bounded above) with the contract than without
it. In a manner similar to Section 2, one can show that under some mild assumptions,
a contract is strongly accepted if and only if it is accepted by almost-perfectly informed
experts who face some residual uncertainty.
DEFINITION 6. A contract C is strongly accepted by an uninformed expert if there exists
a random generator of theories ζC ∈∆(Ω) and some δ0 >0 such that
EζC{Us}>δ0 for every path s ∈Ω. (4)
Assume that Bob does not know the data generating process. If (4) is satisﬁed then
his expected utility (calculated under ζC) is higher (and bounded above) with the con-
tract than without it, no matter which sequence of outcomes is realized.
PROPOSITION 2. Let C be a bounded contract. If C is strongly accepted by an informed
expert then it is strongly accepted by an uninformed expert.
By Proposition 2, there is no contract that separates informed and uninformed ex-
perts. With limited liability, it is not feasible for Alice to write down a screening contract
that is accepted only by the informed experts.
7The functionUP is assumed to be ℑ-measurable.
8Given that ζ has ﬁnite support, E ζ{Us} is well deﬁned.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Contracts and uncertainty 9
4. CONCLUSION
The nonexistence of a contract that separates informed and uninformed experts shows
that contracts cannot mitigate the adverse selection problem faced by a principal, who
wants to know payoff-relevant probabilities, and an agent who may or may not know
these probabilities. In particular, even if the agent knows the payoff-relevant probabili-
tiesandtheprincipaliswillingtopaylargeamountstolearntheseprobabilities, shewill
not learn them perfectly because she cannot be certain that the expert is informed.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Let ˜ η ≡ u(w − η) − u(w), and let δ := − ˜ η˜ " > 0. Assume that
c(1,p) < 0 (the proof is completely analogous if c(0,p) < 0). Then, p ≤ 1 − ˜ ". Other-
wise,
min
p0 ∈ B ˜ "(p)
p0u(w +c(1,p))+(1−p0)u(w +c(0,p))=u(w +c(1,p))<u(w).
Given that p ≤1− ˜ ", u(w) is less than or equal to
min




p + ˜ "

u(w +c(1,p))+(1−p − ˜ ")u(w +c(0,p))




≤pu(w +c(1,p))+(1−p)u(w +c(0,p))+ ˜ " ˜ η.
Hence
pu(w +c(1,p))+(1−p)u(w +c(0,p))≥u(w)+δ. 
4.1 Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
THEOREM (Fan 1953, Theorem 2). Let X be a compact Hausdorff space and let Y be a
convex subset of a linear space (not topologized). Let f be a real-valued function on X ×Y
such that for every y ∈ Y, the function f (x,y) is lower semicontinuous with respect to x.















where Eζ is the expectation operator associated with ζ∈Λ[0,1].10 Olszewski and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
By the linearity of the expectation operator, H is linear in both p and ζ. Moreover,
H is continuous on p that belong to the compact set [0,1]. Hence, it follows from Fan’s

























Therefore, for some ¯ ζ∈Λ[0,1],
H(p, ¯ ζ)≥u(w)+δ/2 for all p ∈[0,1].
So
¯ ζ(0)=H(0, ¯ ζ)≥u(w)+δ/2 and ¯ ζ(1)=H(1, ¯ ζ)≥u(w)+δ/2. 
LEMMA 2. Lettheset Ωbeendowedwiththeproducttopology(i.e.,thetopologythatcom-
prises unions of cylinders with ﬁnite base). Let C be a bounded contract. Then, the func-
tionUP is continuous.
PROOF. Assume, by contradiction, that s(n)→ ¯ s as n →∞ andU(s(n),P) does not con-
verge toU(¯ s,P) as n →∞; assume further, passing to a subsequence of s(n) if necessary,
thatnosubsequenceofU(s(n),P)convergestoU(¯ s,P). Takeasubsequenceofs(n)(also
indexed by n) such that the ﬁrst n coordinates of s(n) and ¯ s are identical. Given that
U(s,P) belongs to a compact subset of the real line, there is a convergent subsequence
ofU(s(n),P) (still indexed by n). LetU be the limit of this convergent subsequence, i.e.,

















U(s,P)=Un(s,P)+Un(s,P)Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Contracts and uncertainty 11
and
|U −U(¯ s,P)|=|U −U(s(n),P)+Un(s(n),P)+Un(s(n),P)−Un(¯ s,P)−Un(¯ s,P)|.
By deﬁnition, Un(s(n),P) = Un(¯ s,P) (because the ﬁrst n coordinates of s(n) and ¯ s
are identical). So,
|U −U(¯ s,P)|=|U −U(s(n),P)+Un(s(n),P)−Un(¯ s,P)|.
Both |U −U(s(n),P)| and |Un(s(n),P)−Un(¯ s,P)|≤|Un(s(n),P)|+|Un(¯ s,P)| converge
to zero as n goes to inﬁnity. Hence, |U −U(¯ s,P)| converges to zero as n → ∞, which is a
contradiction. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Let H :∆(Ω)×Λ∆(Ω)→[0,1] be deﬁned by
H(P,ζ)= EPEζU(s,Q).
Bythe linearityof theexpectation operator, H islinear inboth P and ζ. By Lemma2,
U(s,Q) is continuous in s for every Q. Given that EζU(s,Q) can be written as a ﬁnite




it follows that EζU(s,Q) is continuous in s.
Let the set ∆(Ω) be endowed with the weak*-topology. The weak*-topology on ∆(Ω)
is the weakest topology that makes the expectation operator EPh a continuous function
when h : Ω → R is continuous.9 So, H(P,ζ) is continuous in P. Moreover, ∆(Ω) is a
compactandmetric(andsoHausdorff)space(seeRudin1973,Theorems3.15and3.17).


























Therefore, for some ζC ∈Λ∆(Ω),
H(P,ζC)≥δ/2 for all P ∈∆(Ω).
Given any s ∈Ω, let Ps ∈∆(Ω) be the probability measure that assigns probability one to
s. Then, for any s ∈Ω,
EζC{Us}=H(Ps,ζC)≥δ/2. 
9See Rudin (1973, Chapter 3) for a deﬁnition and basic results regarding the weak*-topology.12 Olszewski and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
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